Ecosino Essay, Research PaperContentI.IntroductionII. Principle of China & # 8217 ; s foreign policy: from & # 8220 ; United Front against Hegemonism & # 8221 ; to & # 8221 ; Independent Foreign Policy & # 8221 ; A.United Front against Soviet in 70 & # 8217 ; s i.Sino-Soviet struggle ii.
Sino-American reconciliation iii.The Theory of Three World B.Independent Foreign Policy in 80 & # 8217 ; s i.
The Five Principles of Peaceful Coexistence ii.Motivations of policy changeIII.Sino-American interaction A.The Taiwan issue i.From the 1972 Shanghai Communiqu to the constitution of diplomatic Relation 1979 ii.
The Taiwan Relation Act ( TRA ) iii.Period after TRA to 1982 Joint Communiqu iv.Communiqu on August 17,1982 v.
Conclusion B.Trade dealingss i.Economic policy after 1978 ii.
Textile trade tensionIV.Conclusion Endnotes Bibliography Following the decease of Mao Zedong in 1976 and the purging of the & # 8220 ; pack of four & # 8221 ; , the twelvemonth 1978 marked a turning point in post-Mao China. It symbolized an terminal every bit good as a beginning. At the Third Plemnum of the Eleventh Chinese Communist Party Central Committee held in December 1978, Deng Xiaoping emerged as the top leader of China, and gained credence far his program to do economic development the highest end for his state. A plan + & # 8220 ; Four Modernization & # 8221 ; + is designed to accomplish this end, and the purpose of the plan is to catch the Western industrialized states by the twelvemonth of 2000. To implement the plan, a immense sum of Capital and a stable international environment is need, it & # 8217 ; s necessary for China to beef up dealingss with U.S.
as a restraint on USSR and as a beginning of engineering and Capital. Thus, by 70 & # 8217 ; s the foreign policy of the PRC had under gone seemingly alterations and a new Chinese foreign policy had emerged. The chief intent of this paper is to give a brief description of China foreign policy in the 70 & # 8217 ; s and 80 & # 8217 ; s including the rules and the factors that shape these policies. Furthermore, a big portion of this paper will concern the Sino-U.
S. relation, particularly on the job of Taiwan and the trade dealingss. Because U.S. plays the most of import function in China & # 8217 ; s foreign policy, and the Taiwan and the trade dealingss issues are the most critical struggle in the political and economic facet between two states. II.Principle of China & # 8217 ; s foreign policy: from & # 8220 ; United Front against Hegemonism & # 8221 ; to & # 8221 ; Independent Foreign Policy & # 8221 ; A.United Front against Soviet in the 70 & # 8217 ; s In 70 & # 8217 ; s, China & # 8217 ; s foreign policy was aimed at organizing a united forepart against Soviet with United States and her Alliess.
However, the Sino-Soviet relation in the early 50 & # 8217 ; s and during Korean war were characterized by Mao & # 8217 ; s & # 8220 ; thin to one side & # 8221 ; , and the United States was the rule enemy. The alteration in China & # 8217 ; s policy towards Soviet from & # 8220 ; thin to one side & # 8221 ; to against started from the late 50 & # 8217 ; s. In a series of issues, Soviet once more and once more defeated and irritated Chinese, and eventually made China turned against Soviet. i.Sino-Soviet conflicta.Different in background Although both China and Soviet are communist states, the historical background of these two Communist party is wholly different.
The first difference is that the Chinese Communists ever felt themselves as the party of national release of a state long kept in colonial or semi-colonial status, so they seen their revolution as a national and anti-imperialist one, and as a theoretical account for other revolutions in the colonial universe. However, Soviet saw itself as an imperialist power, and ne’er felt that their battle for revolution in Russian was a battle for national release from foreign imperialist rule.1 The 2nd difference is that the function of military force in radical battle.
To Soviet, violent is non necessary in the procedure of revolution, it can be done in a more peaceable manner. The usage of violent in October Revolution justify in that state of affairs. But to Chinese, the Communist Party was formed after decennaries of wars, including civil war and wars against foreign imperialist. So, in Chinese & # 8217 ; s position, armed force and violet is decidedly necessary in the procedure of revolution, and can be characterized by Mao & # 8217 ; s & # 8220 ; political power grows out of the gun & # 8221 ; .2b.Conflict of involvement The difference of historical background is non the chief ground of the struggle between China and Soviet, the existent ground is the struggle of involvement started from late 50 & # 8217 ; s. In the early 50 & # 8217 ; s, China was to a great extent depended on Soviet & # 8217 ; s weaponries ( as in the Korean War ) , economic and proficient AIDSs, and diplomatic support.
But after Stalin & # 8217 ; s decease, Soviet began to cut down the dependence. Furthermore, during late 50 & # 8217 ; s and early 60 & # 8217 ; s, a figure of disagreement developed among the two countries:31.Moscow & # 8217 ; s double-faced attitude during the Quemoy crisis, when it gave propaganda supportto Beijing & # 8217 ; s demand but refused to provide it with air-to air missiles comparable to thosesupplied by U.
S. to Taiwan. 2.Soviet refusal of the Chinese petition for a sample atomicbomb and designs for its production despite the general pledges contained in the 1957agreement for technological assistance. 3.Moscow & # 8217 ; s impersonal base in the Sino-Indian borderdispute of 1959. 4.Khrushcher & # 8217 ; s preparedness to seek to better Soviet-American dealingss byhis visit to president Eisenhower at Camp David in 1959.
5.In malice of Beijing & # 8217 ; s repeatedprotest, Moscow decided to subscribe the limited nuclear-test prohibition pact with U.S. in 1963. Furthermore, the 1968 Soviet invasion of Czechoslovakia, the Brezhnev Doctrine the justified Soviet intercession in socialist states, and 1969 Sino-Soviet boundary line clangs along the Ussuri River had greatly strong Chinese frights that Soviet would take major military actions against China. China so began seeking to set up political contact with United States,4 in order to compensate the menace of Soviet, and this is the beginning of the united forepart against Soviet. ii.Sino-American rapprochementa.
Motivation Although the Soviet menace was a major motivation of Sino-American reconciliation, it & # 8217 ; s non the exclusive motivation, there was still other grounds that made China make up one’s mind to better relation with United States First, Chinese leader believed that the United States was losing its battle in Vietnam and its place in the universe was in diminution, therefore no longer posed a direct menace to China.5 That means United States had become the secondary enemy in the battle, and China should ally itself with the secondary enemy + the United States + in order to oppose the primary enemy + the Soviet Union. Second, the standardization with United States universe clear off obstructions for the PRC & # 8217 ; s foreign dealingss created by United States and beef up its diplomatic negotiations in Asia and globally. A major discovery was its admittance to the United Nations in 1971 with the support of the United States.6 Thirdly, its the job of Taiwan, Chinese believe that Taiwan & # 8217 ; s continued refusal to come to footings with mainland China was chiefly the consequence of American support of the island. And, an improved relation with United States would give dividends in the inquiry of Taiwan. Finally, there was a desire for technological contact with United States.
After Old ages of political run, including 50 & # 8217 ; s Great Lap Forward, 60 & # 8217 ; s & # 8211 ; 70 & # 8217 ; s Cultural Revolution, China & # 8217 ; s economic state of affairs was earnestly hurt. Deng Xiao-ping adopted a positive attitude toward China & # 8217 ; s economic system, he knew that the western fiscal support was really of import to China, and reconciliation with the United States would give China the entree to the scientific and proficient cognition and equipment necessary for national development. Furthermore, a better relation with the United States will give assurance to other western states, therefore increase their investing and support to China. b.Normalization of dealingss In February 1972, President Nixon made his historical trip to China. During the trip, Nixon met Mao and Shou and signed the Shanghai Communiqu, this symbolized the establishing of diplomatic dealingss between China and the United States.
In the communiqu, the United States made some grant on the Taiwan issue,7 and a committedness to normalise Sino-American dealingss. In add-on, China & # 8217 ; s attempt to construct a Global United Front against Soviet menace was included in the Communiqu, which stated that neither provinces should & # 8220 ; seek hegemony in the Asia Pacific part and each is opposed to attempts by any other state or groups of states to set up hegemony. & # 8221 ; 8 This proviso was clearly aimed at the Soviet Union. iii.The theory of three universes China & # 8217 ; s reconciliation with the United States in the early 70 & # 8217 ; s aroused rough unfavorable judgment from elements of the utmost international left.9 In order to mask the fact that China had been leaning toward United States, Beijing developed a new ideological principle know as the theory of the Three Worlds. This theory was foremost advocated by Mao in February 1974: In my position, the United States and the Soviet Union organize the first universe.
Japan, Europe and Canada, the in-between subdivision, belong to the 2nd universe. We are the 3rd universe. The 3rd universe has a immense population. With the exclusion of Japan, Asia belongs to the 3rd universe. The whole of Africa belongs to the 3rd universe, and Latin America too.10 Harmonizing to the theory, since early 60 & # 8217 ; s, the Soviet had degenerated into & # 8220 ; social-imperialism & # 8221 ; , as a consequence, the socialist cantonment was no longer in being. Furthermore, decolonisation had produced a big figure of new state in Asia, Africa, and Latin America. Due to the alteration in international state of affairs, the universe divided into three parts, that are both interrelated and in contradiction to one another.
The opposition of both the 3rd and 2nd universe against the hegemonism of the two world powers had become the major characteristic of universe politics.11 This new theory was clearly different from Mao & # 8217 ; s old categorization of the universe into the socialist and imperialist states, and suggested that the relation between the two cantonment was no longer the chief contradiction. Furthermore, the theory suggested that all Third World states, irrespective of societal system, could be a portion of the same united forepart against hegemonism. Finally, the theory advocated that the Second World, despite it contradiction with the Third World, could besides be an of import ally of China in opposing the Soviet Union. To this point, China & # 8217 ; s united forepart against Soviet formed by its new foreign policy in the 60 & # 8217 ; s and early 70 & # 8217 ; s was already established. And China could so concentrated on its modernisation plan.
B.Independent Foreign Policy In early 80 & # 8217 ; s, the attack of China to international dealingss was changed. This started from Beijing abandoned its old entreaty for an anti-Soviet united forepart and began to emphasize the & # 8220 ; independency & # 8221 ; of its foreign policy. The chief alterations of policy was on the Moscow-Washington-Beijing dealingss, China abandoned the united forepart formed in 70 & # 8217 ; s and intended to organize a equal dealingss between Soviet Union and United States. Therefore, the Theory of Three World non longer function as the footing of China & # 8217 ; s foreign policy, a new rule + The Five Principles of Peaceful Coexistence + was the applied.
i.The Five Principles of Peaceful Coexistence ( FPPC ) 1.mutual regard for sovereignty and territorial integrity2.
mutual nonaggression3.mutual nonintervention in internal affairs4.equality and common benefit5.peaceful coexistence12 Those rules, foremost initiated in 1954, had later became the basic line of China & # 8217 ; s foreign policy in the whole 1980 & # 8217 ; s and was still applied in the 90 & # 8217 ; s.
ii.Motivation of Policy change The developments in China & # 8217 ; s foreign policy in early 80 & # 8217 ; s seemed to corroborate the Chinese & # 8220 ; independent & # 8221 ; foreign policy, but why had the Chinese foreign policy changed? The new Chinese inclination to equilibrate between the two world powers reflects both past tradition and current political appraisals. Historically, China has ever tried to hold an independent policy.
However, China was defeated by the Western powers and became a semi-colonized state in the late 19th and early twentieth centuries. So, the new Chinese are particularly sensitive to issues refering China & # 8217 ; s sovereignty, independency, and territorial unity. In 1981, as Sino-American dealingss were deteriorating because of the Taiwan issue, China understood that it couldn & # 8217 ; t depend to much on the United States since its still a & # 8220 ; imperialism & # 8221 ; power, and China & # 8217 ; s foreign policy should go more independent and self-reliance.13 In add-on, due to rapprochement of Sino-Soviet relation and domestic political relations state of affairss, the alterations took topographic point.
a.Deterioration of Sino-American relation When Ronald Reagan, a long-time protagonist of Taiwan, was elected President of the United States in 1980, Beijing felt leery of the purposes of the new U.S. Government. Reagan took a tougher base toward the Soviet Union than old disposal, which was urged by China in the past.14 However, Chinese leaders were no longer concern about the Soviet menace, due to Sino-Soviet renomalization of relation. On the other manus, during the 1980 U.
S. presidential run, Beijing was extremely disturbed by Reign & # 8217 ; s promise to reconstruct official dealingss with the ROC on Taiwan.15 Furthermore, the Taiwan weaponries gross revenues issue, the Chinese strong belief that the U.S.
was loath to reassign advanced engineering to China, and the difference over Chinese textile exports to the United States farther reduced Beijing & # 8217 ; s assurance in the U.S. after Reagan became president of the United States.16b.Sino-Soviet renormalisation In April, 1979, Beijing gave notice expiration of its 1950 pact of confederation with the Soviet Union, at the earliest clip allowable under the footings of the pact. At the same clip, nevertheless, China proposed negotiations with the Soviet Union aimed at easing Sino-Soviet tension.17 And this was the first clip since the 1969 boundary line clang that the Chinese made such a gesture. In the first unit of ammunition of the negotiations, there wasn & # 8217 ; t any important advancement, and the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan later had made the negotiations even more hard, to go on.
Although these normalization negotiations were non resumed until 1982, nevertheless, both sides carefully maintained some impulse in their relationship during the interval. The major force that moved China towards reconciliation with the Soviet Union was the economic consideration. China & # 8217 ; s most pressing precedence in the 80 & # 8217 ; s and beyond is to overhaul its economic system. In order to guarantee the success of modernisation, China has to cut down its defence disbursement so that resources can be concentrated on economic reform. This requires a decrease of foreign tenseness and peaceable environment, for which vitamin D tente with the Soviet Union is an indispensable component.18 Another major ground was the alteration in Beijing & # 8217 ; s perceptual experiences of the international environment. In the early 1980 & # 8217 ; s, Beijing reappraised the Soviet menace and came the decision that Soviet were less unsafe than before.
19 The Chinese leaders believe that the Soviet Union was bogged down in Afghanistan, Poland, andturning economic troubles. c.Domestic Politics China & # 8217 ; s domestic development during 1979-1981 besides contributed to Beijing & # 8217 ; s determination to Change its international position and indurate it stance toward the United States on the Taiwan issue. While the reform plan adopted in 1978 brought great outlook to Chinese people, serious job arose during the follow two old ages. The Four Modernization plan was so ambitious that the Chinese leading degree Fahrenheit eared a loss of control. Economically, serious imbalances and inflation appeared for the first time in many years. Politically, the Chinese leadership worried very much about becoming too dependent on the West and experiencing the negative effects of Western ideas and values on their society.20 In the cause of these development, the Chinese leadership convened a central work conference in 1980 to make significant changes on both domestic and foreign policy.
This meeting adopted a proposal from Chen Yun for a period of retrenchment and readjustment to correct the economic imbalance. The meeting also adopted measures to check the spread of foreign ideas and foreign influence.21 Under all these reason, China then adopted its new “independent” foreign policy in 1980’s, it’s clearly that China didn’t want to depend too much on any countries, however, no one can deny that China’s modernization program needed other countries support, especially the United States. So, Sino-American and Sino-Soviet relations was again normalized after 1982, however, it’s no longer a relation of ally.
III.Sino-American InteractionA.The Taiwan Issue Beijing bas constantly asserted that the Taiwan issue is of great significance to the sovereignty of the PRC, and to the prospect for continued development of Sino-American relations.
For the PRC, it’s a question left over from the Chinese civil war and a political by-product of U.S. interference.22 Ever since its rapprochement with the United States in the early 1970’s, China has maintained that the Taiwan issue is the major obstacle between the two nations. However, due to dynamics of the Washington-Moscow-Beijing triangle as well as the Chinese domestic polities, China has not always placed equal emphasis on the Taiwan issue in its policy toward the United States.
During the 1970’s, when Sino-American relations began to improve and finally reached formal diplomatic relation, Chinese leaders decided to set aside the Taiwan issue and to concentrate their effort on uniting with United States in a “united front” against Soviet. After Ronald Reagan because president, U.S. built up its military strength and resumed a hard-line policy toward Moscow. Consequently, China was no longer so concerned about the Soviet threat, thus giving Beijing the opportunity to press the U.
S. on the Taiwan issue. Dispute the establishment of formal diplomatic relation between the PRC and the United States in 1979, the Taiwan issue remains unsolved. The Taiwan problem has been a major point of contention between Beijing and Washington since 1950, when President Harry Truman ordered the U.S. Seventh Fleet to neutralize the Taiwan strait following outbreak of the Korean War.23 In the early 1950, when the Nationalist Chinese were defeated by the Communist forces and moved to Taiwan, Washington decided to abandon it former wartime ally. However, with the direct confrontation between China and the United States in the Korean War later that year, the containment of China become a firm policy in Washington.
As part of the containment policy, Washington continued to provide the ROC on Taiwan with political, military, and economy assistance. In 1954, Washington signed a defense treaty with Taipei.24 As a result of these development, United States continued for almost three decades to recognize the ROC as the legal government of China, and to deny recognition to the PRC and to pursue a policy of “Two China”. In Beijing’s view, the major reason for the existence of the Taiwan issue is the continuing U.
S. intervention. If the United States not intervened to the ROC, the PRC argues, Communist forces would have complete the sacred mission of returning Taiwan to the motherland.25 Although Beijing has always maintained the China’s reunification is the fundamental national goal, the actual priority that Beijing has given to the Taiwan issue in its policy toward the United States has changed several times as the international situation has changed. i.From the 1972 Shanghai Communiqu to the establishment of diplomatic Relations in 1979. Dispute the disagreement on the Taiwan question, the PRC decided to make strategic concession on it during Nixon’s visit to China in 1972 and to focus on common U.S.
-China Strategic interests and normalization of relations. When Nixon concluded his visit, a joint communiqu was issued in Shanghai which was know as the Shanghai Communiqu . Concerning the status of Taiwan, the PRC says in the communiqu : The Chinese side reaffirmed it position: the Government of the People’s Republic of China is the sole legal government of China; Taiwan is a province of China which has long been returned to the motherland; the liberation of Taiwan is China’s internal affair in which no other country has the right to interfere; and all U.S. force and military installation must be withdraw from Taiwan.
The Chinese Government firmly opposes any activities which aimed at the creation “one China, one Taiwan,”, “one China, two government” or advocate that “the states of Taiwan remains to be determined.”26 In a careful piece of warding, the United states declared its position on Taiwan in the communiqu by saying it “acknowledges that all Chinese on either side of Taiwan is a part of China. The United States does not challenge that position.”27 From Washington’s perspective, therefore, the status of Taiwan is still undetermined because the U.S. only “acknowledged”, but not “recognize”, that Taiwan was part of China. But this statement would virtually rule out U.S.
support for an independent Taiwan. When China and the United States established formal diplomatic relations in 1979, Beijing was successful in winning Washington’s acceptance of its three conditions for normalization of relations: (1) derecognition of the Republic of China; (2) termination of the 1954 U.S.-ROC Mutual Defense Treaty; and (3) withdrawal of all American troops and military installation from the ROC on Taiwan.
28 Concerning the legal status of Taiwan, the United States stated in the normalization communiqu in December 1978 that it “recognizes” the government of the PRC as the sole legal government of China, but “acknowledges” the Chinese position that there is but one China and Taiwan is part of China. However, in Chinese text, the word “chengren” is used is both clauses,29 which means “recognize” in English. It’s impossible that the United States did not know the exact meaning of these critical world, therefore, it’s possible that both countries were still disagree about the status of Taiwan. ii.The Taiwan Relation ACT (TRA) As promised in his announcement of the establishment of Sino-American diplomatic relations, President Carter submitted to Congress draft legislation to regulate future unofficial relations with the ROC on Taiwan.
Most members of the Congress were dissatisfied with the President’s proposal because of its ambiguity in the question of Taiwan’s security.30 After holding extensive hearing on the question of future U.S. relations with the ROC on Taiwan, the Congress passed the Taiwan Relations Act (TRA) in March 1979,31 which was much more explicit than President Carter’s plan in the U.S. Commitment to Taiwan’s security.
On 10 April, 1979, President Carter signed the act into public, and it has served as the basic document for unofficial U.S.-ROC relations since then.
32 With regard to protecting Taiwan, the Act stated that it’s the policy of United Stated:1)to make clear that the United States decision to establish diplomatic relations with thePeople’s Republic of China rests upon the exception that the future of Taiwan will bedetermined by peaceful means; 2)to consider any effort to determined the future of Taiwanby other than peaceful means, including by boycotts or embargoes, a threat to the peace andsecurity of the Western Pacific area and of grave concern to the United States; 3)toprovided Taiwan with arms of a defensive character; 4)to maintain the capacity of theUnited States to resist any resort to force or other forms of coercion that wouldjeopardize the security, or the social or economic system, of the people of the people ofTaiwan.33 On the critical question of arms sales to Taiwan, the TRA stated that “the United States will make available to Taiwan such defense articles and defense service in such quality as may be necessary to enable Taiwan to maintain a sufficient self-defense capacity.”34 China’s reaction to the Act at the time was quite moderate, it didn’t protest during the period between the passage of the bill on March 29 and its signature into law by President Carter on April 10. The main reason for China’s low profile on the TRA was apparently its desire to avoid endanger the relationship just established.
35 Another reason was probably that President Carter had imposed a one-year moratorium on arms sales to Taiwan.36iii.Period after TRA to Joint Communiqu in 1982 Despite the passage of TRA, the Taiwan issue was relatively quiescent in 1979, during which time the United States sold no military equipment to Taiwan, the Chinese press contained few harsh statements about U.S.
interference in Taiwan.37 However, when Ronald Reagan, a long-time supporter of the ROC, became the Republican presidential candidate in 1980, the confrontation between PRC and the United States over the Taiwan began to intensify. The major point of contention was Reign’s campaign call for the restoration of official relations with the ROC on Taiwan. a.Reign’s Campaign Statement The polemics over the Taiwan issue came to a head on 25 August 1980. On that day, Reagan held a news conference in Los Angeles, at which he set forth the fundamental principles for his China policy.
In it he proposed that the United States would carry on its relations with the ROC on Taiwan “in accordance with the law, the Taiwan Relations Act.” Criticizing Carter’s decision to accept “China’s three conditions for normalization” as “not necessary and not in our national interest,” Reagan reiterated that he had favored the “retention of a liaison office on Taiwan of equivalent status to the one which we had earlier established in Beijing.” He went on to say that Congress provided in the TRA “the official basis for our relation with our long-time friend and ally…… And, most important, it spells our policy of providing defensive weapons to Taiwan.”38 Beijing reacted strongly to Reign’s remark on future U.S. relations with the ROC. Renmin Ribao first accused Reagan of “playing a little trick,” and talked about the required counterattack against his word and action.
”39 Then, in a major article, the paper criticized Reagan, saying that his idea of establishing “official relations” with Taiwan “runs counter to the fundamental principle of the Communiqu on the establishment of diplomatic relations between China and the United States.”40 Although the commentary emphasized the importance of continued friendly Sino-American relations, it also made a threat that any attempt to restore “official relations” with Taiwan “would inevitable lead to grave retrogression in Sino-American relations” and would ” have serious adverse effect on the struggle against hegemonism and for safeguarding world peace.”41b.
U.S. Arms Sales to Taiwan U.S. arms sales to Taiwan have been the central issue in Sino-American relations since the two countries exchanged diplomatic recognition in 1979. From Beijing’s perspective, U.
S. arms sales to Taiwan represent a strident example of insensitively to China’s feelings and basic concerns. Moreover, Chinese leaders feel that U.S. arms sales to an integral part of their territory clearly constitute interference in China’s internal affairs.
They strongly believe that there is a linkage between U.S. arms sales to Taiwan and the reunification of China. c.
Haig’s visit to China Different from his attitude during the presidential campaign, after taken the office, Reagan was gradual to recognize the important of China-U.S. relation. In May 1981, as a major move in it China policy, the Administration announced that Secretary of State Alexander Haig would visit China in mid-June.42 During his visit to China, Secretary Hag emphasized the “strategic imperative” for closer Sino-American ties as a means of coping with the global Soviet threat. At the end of his trip, Secretary Hag announced at a press conference that the United States would consider selling weapons to China on a case-by-case basis. However, the Taiwan issue still dominated the talks between Hag and Chinese leaders. While discussing the issue with Secretary Hag in Beijing, Foreign Minister Hung Hue seriously pointed out that since U.
S.-China normalization of relations the United States had not taken any positive steps toward solving the problem of its arms sales to Taiwan.43d.
The FX decision During the Carter Administration, the ROC wanted to purchases advance U.S. fighters such as the F-16 or the F-15 to replace its aging planes.
Washington refused to sell such modern aircraft to the ROC because it did not wish to jeopardize its relationship with the PRC. Instead, the U.S. Government asked both Northrop and General Dynamics to design a new fighter, designated FX by the Pentagon, with limited range and ground attack capability for export to the ROC and similar countries.44 However, after lengthy expert study of the matter, decided in November 1981 not to sell the FX fighters to the ROC, but to continue co-producing the F-5E with them.45 To lessen Taipei’s disappointment, Washington decided to sell $97 million worth spare part to Taiwan.
In Washington’s consideration, the decision on VEX fighters is a considerable concession to Beijing, however, the Chinese lodged a continue co-production of F-5E with the ROC.46 In addition, the Chinese reiterated their demand that the United States specify quantitative, qualitative, and time limits on arms sales to Taiwan. iv.Communiqu of August 17, 1982 Early in April 1982, in order to reverse the decline in Sino-American relations, President Reagan wrote to Zhao Ziyang and Deng Xiaoping. In these letter, Reagan outlined three basic principles of American policy towards China: (1) There was only “one China”, and the unofficial relations with Taiwan would not weaken this basic commitment; (2) the U.S.
appreciated the Chinese proposal on the peaceful reunification of China; and (3) the need to sell arms to Taiwan would decrease as conditions for the peaceful reunification of China improved.47 In addition, Reagan proposed a visit by Vice President Bush to China to discuss the Taiwan issue. Clearly, Bush’s mission was to bring the Chinese back to the negotiating table and to try to restore China’s confidence in the U.S. intention to strengthen Sino-American relation. In his meeting with Deng Xiaoping, Bush pointed out specifically that the U.
S. refusal to specify a cutoff data for it arms sales to Taiwan did not represent an assertion of an indefinite right to carry on such sales. Although Bush’s visit didn’t gain any agreement upon the arms sales problem, it did gain a breakthrough in the arms sales negotiations.48 After several months of negotiation, the PRC and the United States finally reached on agreement on arms sales issue on August 17, 1982.
The United States reaffirmed its position on the issue of sovereignty over Taiwan as indicated in the 1979 normalization agreement. In addition, the U.S. expressed its appreciation of China’s