Knowledge Essay, Research Paper
When discoursing the construct of cognition it must be made clear what type of cognition is being discussed. Three types of cognition are proposed in doctrine ; object cognition, know-how cognition, and propositional cognition. Object cognition involves a individual, topographic point, or thing. For illustration stating that I know my friend Antony is object cognition, connoting that I have had personal contact with him and it could besides connote that I know facts about him. Know-how consists of abilities such as cognizing how to ski. An Olympic skier who goes to the inclines every twenty-four hours to pattern has know-how cognition of skiing. Meanwhile a scientist, who surveies the natural philosophies of skiing, the physiological make up of the skier and has ne’er skied before, has the 3rd and concluding type of cognition, propositional cognition. This signifier of cognition trades with something that is either true or false, in other words the is a proposition stated as the class of propositional cognition indicates.
Propositional cognition is the most problematic of the three and involves more in deepness thoughts to it, hence I will pass my words on this signifier of cognition. Basically knowledge demands two things, truth and belief. Belief in the individuals mind that what they know is true and truth is self-explainable. But, when it comes down to it knowledge requires more. Peoples can be fooled into believing things, true or non, by other people. These individuals have a true belief in what they were told to believe but they don? T really have cognition of the topic. This where justification comes into drama. If I am justified in cognizing that my auto is ruddy I have grounds to back up my claim, I and others have viewed the ruddy pigment on the auto and my enrollment has red
written as the colour of the auto. My cognition is strengthened by the back uping grounds behind my claim. The JTB theory suggests that cognition consists of true belief and that it is justified. This leads into the statement on what definition of justification is required for cognition. There is extremely dependable grounds and there is infallible grounds. I have extremely dependable information that my auto is ruddy, but there are variables that could account for the auto to look ruddy in my grounds and really be pink in true colour. Consequently, I can? t be certain that my cognition is strictly infallible, in bend weakening my claim.
There are three counterexamples to the JTB theory. One statement is that a individual may hold justified true be
lief that something will go on, and their justification is extremely dependable. Then have the terminal consequence of the anticipation come true, but non the cognition about how it came to be the consequence. For illustration I may larn that the conditions channel has predicted a 90 % opportunity of rain tomorrow. I so conclude that since my auto is outside and the conditions channel is extremely dependable beginning on conditions forms, my auto will acquire wet tomorrow. The following twenty-four hours it may turn out that the conditions channel has had a miss computation and the storm clouds base on balls over without let go ofing a bead of rain, yet my auto is sprayed with H2O by a neighbour irrigating his flowers. I had good justification in my true belief that my auto was traveling to acquire wet, but I lack the cognition about the more specific result of the anticipation. This is similar to the philosopher Edmund Gettier? s counterexample. Another counterexample came from Bertrand Russell, which contemplates a extremely dependable clock. While go throughing by the clock, a adult male stops to observe the clip given by the clock. It indicates that the clip is 9:55, so the adult male walks on with the justified impression that this clock is dependable and has given him the right clip. Unknown to the adult male the clock had stopped dead
precisely 24 hours ago. So the adult male has a justified true belief that the clip is 9:55, but he doesn & # 8217 ; T
cognize that this is the right clip. A 3rd counterexample was proposed by Elliott Sober. He explains a just lottery. 1,000 tickets are sold in this lottery and I have bought ticket figure 452, with the odds being 1 in 1,000 that I will be the victor, I make the logical premise that ticket 452 will non win. As it turns out 452 didn? T win and my guess was right. My belief was true and I had good ground to believe that my opportunities of winning were little, but after all I had no definite cognition of the result of the lottery. Using these counterexamples we can see that justified true belief? s merely aren? t plenty to confirm cognition.
The thoughts proposed here lead to the finding that we wear? Ts have existent cognition of anything. This is considered the construct of incredulity. Senses can take us to grounds of what the universe is, some think this to be knowledge. Senses nevertheless can be deceived, so no affair what we can? t be perfectly positive that our grounds is infallible, once more tilting towards incredulity of cognition. From these positions the incredulity statement seems to be deductively valid, but so harmonizing to these constructs we can ne’er cognize whether this is perfectly certain either.