Stalin Essay, Research PaperStalin & # 8217 ; s lift to power was a combination of his ability to pull strings state of affairss and the failure of others to forestall him from taking power, particularly Leon Trotsky.
Trotsky did non take advantage of several chances which would hold helped him to oppress Stalin politically. When he failed to take advantage of these chances, Stalin maneuvered himself into a stronger place within the party by allying with Zinoviev and Kamnev. He manipulated them into oppressing Trotsky, therefore extinguishing the strongest opposition in his way to power. Stalin dexterously avoided possible political ruin when Lenin formulated his Testament in December 1922.
Lenin & # 8217 ; s Testament described what he thought of the hereafter of the Party and Party leaders, particularly Trotsky and Stalin. Lenin warned of a possible split in which Stalin and Trotsky would be the main factors. When depicting Stalin, Lenin felt that he had concentrated & # 8221 ; limitless authorization in his custodies and whether he will ever be capable of utilizing that authorization with sufficient caution.
& # 8221 ; ( Clark 472 ) . The content of Lenin & # 8217 ; s Testament finally became more damaging to Trotsky than Stalin. Coupled with the Lenin by the way sabotaging Trotsky, Stalin manipulated the content of the Testament to heighten his stature.
By adverting Stalin as one of the outstanding members of the Party, Lenin raised Stalin & # 8217 ; s stature to that of Trotsky. The tantamount stature of Stalin and Trotsky made Trotsky look to be less of import in relation to Lenin and therefore to the Party setup. Further damaging Trotsky, Lenin described him as possessing & # 8221 ; inordinate assurance and excessively attracted by the strictly administrative facets of personal businesss & # 8221 ; ( Clark 472 ) The latter word picture of Trotsky was one that Stalin employed against him throughout their battle for power. Lenin so added a PS to the Testament on January 4, 1923, qualifying Stalin as a hapless pick for Secretary General by saying, & # 8221 ; Stalin is excessively ill-mannered and this defect becomes unbearable in a Secretary General.
& # 8221 ; ( Clark 474 ) . Lenin continued on to province that & # 8221 ; the companions think about a manner of taking Stalin from that station and naming another adult male & # 8221 ; ( Clark 474 ) . Lenin felt that if the remotion of Stalin was non acted upon, the struggle between Trotsky and Stalin would intensify, which would in bend endanger the party as a whole. Combined with the Testament, the Postscript could hold served as a tool for Trotsky to obtain power, alternatively Stalin squashed it in the Central Committee. Another possible advantage left fresh by Trotsky was Lenin & # 8217 ; s dissension with Stalin on how to manage the Georgian Affair. During the war with Poland, the Soviet democracy signed a pact with the Menshevik authorities of Georgia, & # 8221 ; which solemnly undertook to esteem Georgian independence. & # 8221 ; ( Segal 240 ) . Lenin wanted to keep that Georgia remained a & # 8221 ; crowned head and independent unit which would hold joined the Russian federative state.
& # 8221 ; ( Clark 477 ) . As Commissar of Nationalities, Stalin ordered the suppression of the Menshevik party in Georgia. In order to accomplish his end, Stalin was fixing a fundamental law which was & # 8221 ; to be much more centralistic and would restrict and abrogate the rights of the non-Russian nationalities & # 8221 ; Besides in this new fundamental law, Stalin was traveling to alter & # 8221 ; Soviet Federation of democracies into the Soviet Union. & # 8221 ; ( Pro 51 ) Through a series of notes, after the PS, Lenin, with a guilty scruples, admitted that he had non sufficiently stopped the new subjugation of the weak by the strong and viewed the centralistic nature of Stalin & # 8217 ; s strategy as being & # 8220 ; borrowed from Tsardom and merely merely covered with a Soviet veneer & # 8221 ; ( Pro 71 ) . He proceeded to order notes on the Georgian Affair, which were scathing unfavorable judgments of Stalin & # 8217 ; s behavior. He described Stalin as a & # 8220 ; genuinely Russian adult male, the Great Russian chauvinist, who is basically an oppressor & # 8221 ; ( Pro 71 ) . Lenin communicated to Trotsky that he desired him & # 8221 ; take upon yourself the defence of the Georgian matter at the Central Committee & # 8221 ; ( Clark 479 ) and attached a transcript of his notes on the topic.
Warning Trotsky non to demo failing or uncertainness and non to accept any via medias that Stalin might offer. He stressed the demand to avoid warning Stalin and his associates of the violative. Stalin & # 8217 ; s hostility towards Trotsky was evident. He criticized Stalin & # 8217 ; s public presentation as Commissar of Rabkrin by saying that & # 8221 ; it was useless to look to Rabkrin for counsel if the demand arises for any alteration of policy or for any serious reform in organisation & # 8221 ; ( Pro 47 ) . Zinoviev, the most popular member of the Politbureau, acted as Lenin & # 8217 ; s & # 8221 ; loud and stormy mouthpiece World Health Organization cognition about the universe Washington s unrefined and unpolished consequently leaving him devoured by ambition to rise higher in the party ” (Pro 79). Kamenev, though less popular, was more respected by inner party leaders.
Armed with a more cultivated intellect and a steadier character Kamenev was attracted by moderate ideas and policies which set him up as Zinoviev’s idealistic balance. Their traits complemented each other and thus they compromised and worked together well. The combination of these three leaders produced a majority against Trotsky in the Politbureau. Instead of executing Lenin’s intentions, he proceeded to accept an undesirable compromise.
Lenin intended on expelling Stalin from the party for at least two years. Trotsky stated that he ” was against removing Stalin but he agreed with Lenin in substance ” (Pro90). He wanted Stalin to apologize to Krupskaya, behave more loyally to his colleagues, and most importantly stop pushing the Georgians around. Stalin accepted these terms with great enthusiasm.
Eager to rectify his behavior, Stalin prepared a written statement to the general congress that denounced the Great Russian Chauvinism that was being exacted upon the Georgians. The most serious of Lenin’s strokes occurred after this. The final stroke was debilitated him, by paralyzing him, rendering him speechless, and causing him to suffer from sporadic spells of unconsciousness. The generous terms of Trotsky’s compromise and Lenin’s last stroke had multiple effects upon his ability to obtain party leadership and affected how Stalin pursued his leadership goals. Stalin’s triumvirate successfully kept Lenin’s Testament and Postscript inside of the Central Committee. Kamenev objected by stating that it should not be published “because it was not a speech given at the Politbureau.” (Vol 243) Zinoviev thought that the document should only be distributed to the Central Committee.
Stalin suggested that there was no reason to publish the document because Lenin did not leave any instructions to. Tomsky, Solts and Slavatinskaya, all agreed with Zinoviev. The opposition to publication was apparent and the triumvirate succeeded in suppressing Lenin’s documents. Further action against Trotsky was being undertaken by the triumvirate. By using his position as the General Secretary of the Party, Stalin began to install supporters of the ring in place of Trotsky supporters.
Party organizers were employed on the criteria that they were against Trotsky. Political biographies were being reviewed and references to Trotsky were being reduced thus slowly eliminating him from important moments in history. The death of Lenin in January of 1924 allowed the triumvirate to begin to openly attack Trotsky. They labeled Trotsky a factionalist. He wrote two letter that gave Stalin and his allies enough ammunition to render Trotsky politically powerless.
In the first letter Trotsky blamed the Scissors Crisis on ” serious errors of economic and political management by the leadership… which was an effect of the extreme worsening of internal Party conditions was due to the process of bureaucratization that had overwhelmed the Party ” The next letter, named the Trotskyist Manifesto,’ stated that, ” the Party hierarchy, increasingly selects the memberships of conferences and congress changing them into mere extensions of the hierarchy and the factionalism must be stopped by those who instituted it and a more comradely unit must be installed in order to achieve internal Party democracy.” (Vol 248). This letter opened up the opportunity to accuse Trotsky of reverting back to Menshevism. The Thirteenth Party Congress proceeded to condemn Trotsky and his supporters’ opinions as ” a Menshevik revision of Bolshevism.” (Vol249) Labeling Trotsky as a factionalist enabled Stalin to finally start to point out how Trotsky was in disagreement with Lenin and thus was an enemy to the Party.
Stalin took this power and developed himself into the interpreter of Leninism. Stalin worked on eroding Trotsky’s reputation that was built upon the October revolution and the civil war. He characterized Trotsky’s roles in the affairs to be over inflated. Eventually, after constant political attack, Trotsky was informed that under article 58 of the criminal code, ” i.e. the charge of counter-revolutionary activity “(Pro 391) he would be deported to Alma Ata in Turkestan.
Expulsion was the last step in Trotsky’s failure to achieve power. He was taken to Constantinople from where he eventually emigrated to Mexico. Stalin’s ability to take advantage of Trotsky’s errors allowed him to move on to crush the less significant former allies Kamenev and Zinoviev. After eliminating his political opponents Stalin would not be opposed by anyone until his death.