Throughout the Cold War Asia, China’s involvements in the Korean War and the Vietnam War were similar by supporting North Korea and North Vietnam. However, China’s involvements in both wars were different that Chinese Communist soldiers were diligently fought in Korea and China’s engagement was inhibited to the arrangement of defensive troops.The Taiwan Strait Crisis of 1958 also was a significant hotspot in the Cold War Asia that it not only described Chinese Communist Party actively attack Taiwan, such as ordering People’s Liberation Army to shell the Jinmen islands, without physical threat from other countries, but also highlighted the promotion of Mao’s continuous revolution. Furthermore, the Geneva Conference of 1954 reflected Chinese Communist Party has strongly persuaded Vietnam to divide the country for preventing possible America’s intervention. Considering the critical factors of Cold War Asia, China’s vigorous intervention in the Korean War, the Vietnam War in 1964-1969, the Taiwan Strait Crisis of 1958, and the Geneva Conference of 1954 represented its active role in the making of Cold War Asia because Mao believed these events were opportunities for him to maintain revolutionary incentive, to spread the ideology of communism and to demonstrate the ability and strength of Chinese Communists on the international stage. Although we are able to recognize the active involvement of CCP in the Korean War and the Vietnam War through the knowledge of both wars were occurred outside of China and consistently supported by CCP for considering Mao’s China played an active role in making the Cold War Asia, the crucial motivation that induced CCP to encountered both wars was Mao’s goal of spreading Chinese revolutionary influence to the world and contradicting the capitalism. In Mao’s China & The Cold War, Chen Jian indicated that the CCP’s propaganda during the Korean War related to “The Great Movement to Resist American and Assist Korea” quickly went beyond the original focus of “safeguarding our homes and defending our motherland,” which introduced a new stage to emphasize the contribution of Communist leadership to create an authoritative “new China” (Chen 95). By looking at this slogan of the propaganda, it was valid to interpret that the Korean War was contemplated as Mao’s revolutionary war because the slogan proved that the Chinese Communist Party was fighting for liberation against American capitalists and imperialists and expanding the influence of Chinese revolution. On the other hand, there may have some individuals argued that Mao’s China has played a reactive role in making Cold War Asia because the participation of CCP was reasonable for protecting the border between North Korea and China from invasion of U.S. and UN troops. However, this claim was solely Mao and CCP’s assumption of the possible invasion by U.S. and UN troops. This argument also expressed the subjective opinion of Mao and CCP because U.S. and UN troops did not address their attack for the border between North Korea and China, which meant Mao and CCP used their assumption as the justification for China’s involvement in the Korean War. Similar to North Korea, North Vietnam also served as a buffer state that protected China’s border. China’s engagement in the Vietnam War 1964-1969 can be evaluated as an active role in Cold War Asia. In China and the Vietnam Wars, 1950-1975, Qiang Zhai argued that Mao believed the U.S. planned to occupy Taiwan and to colonize South Vietnam and South Korea by expanding their military occupancy (Zhai 141). Zhai’s statement reflected Mao’s presumption of possible threat from U.S. military troops. This argument showed Mao’s decision was primarily based on his assumption. Because the U.S. military troops did not take a physical attack on Chinese territory, Mao’s subjective opinion supported China’s active role in the Vietnam War. Mao’s decision on supporting North Vietnam can be explained by his assumption towards the treat from U.S. military troops because he wanted to take prudent measures against this possible serious treat. Furthermore, other reasons justified China assisted North Vietnam in the Vietnam War were that CCP would like to demonstrate Chinese Communist superiority, to separate itself from the Soviet Union, and to prohibit Vietnam influenced by the Soviet Union. Similar to the Korean War, Mao regarded that providing assistance to North Vietnam could express CCP’s obligation for opposing to capitalists and imperialists. In addition, Mao also may observed the Vietnam War displayed an opportunity for CCP to expand the communist influence in Asia. Regarding to the Taiwan Strait Crisis of 1958, Mao and CCP’s decision to cover Jinmen islands was considered to be Mao’s objective for generating new momentum for his and CCP’s extended revolution. According to Mao’s experience of the Korean War, Mao perceived the necessity of emphasizing the presence of exterior threats, such as GMD in Taiwan. Furthermore, Mao used the Taiwan Strait Crisis to stimulate China’s domestic mobilization and to motivate people’s revolutionary intensity and spirit. Mao and CCP accentuated that “The introduction of the task the liberation of Taiwan is not just for the purpose of undermining the American-jiang plot to sign a military treaty; rather, and more important, by highlighting the task we mean to raise the political consciousness and political alertness of the people of the whole country; we mean to stir up our people’s revolutionary enthusiasm, thus promoting our nation’s socialist reconstruction” (Telegram 27 July 1954). This telegram described Mao and CCP’s intention of intervening the Taiwan Strait Crisis because Mao and CCP claimed that Chinese communists should liberalized Taiwan, which controlled by nationalists. However, under the surface, Mao and CCP craved to maintain Chinese revolutionary momentum and to enhance Chinese revolutionary spirit. Therefore, in Mao’s perspective, his commencement of the Taiwan Strait Crisis considered to be a lucrative case of advocating domestic mobilization through arousing international tension. Shifting back to the Geneva Conference of 1954, CCP believed they needed a stable revolutionary incentive and did not support the acceleration of the struggle in Indochina, so CCP tried its maximum ability to pursue a compromise for avoiding further consequences that may interfere China, such as the possibility of explicit American military mediation. Chen Jian stated, “In justifying his willingness to accept the solution of temporarily divide Vietnam into two areas, with the north belonging to the Communists and the south to the French and pro-French Vietnamese, and to wait for a national plebiscite, Zhou emphasized that this would allow the Viet Minh to control the entire north and gain back the south after the vote” (Chen 141). Chen Jian’s statement showed that Zhou tried to persuade Dong the sufficient solution and compromise of the conference was to separate Vietnam to north and south. This compromise not only illustrated China’s strategy towards the Indochina conflict, but also showed China’s aggressive involvement in the Geneva Conference because CCP primarily considered China’s advantage. Without any direct physical intervention from America, CCP would take an action to prevent conflicts, which pointed out the active behavior of Mao’s China in composing of Cold War Asia.Throughout the Korean War, the Vietnam War, the Taiwan Strait Crisis of 1958 and the Geneva Conference of 1954, China’s centralized goals of spreading Chinese communist influence to the greater extent and pursuing its revolutionary were the rationale of the China’s active role in making of Cold War Asia.